A Good, Hard Look at Singapore's Identity (The Straits Times, 7th September 2006)

IN Singapore, often when I meet someone for the first time, I'm asked: "What are you?" During these moments, many possible answers come to mind. For example, these responses include academic, longboard skateboarder or Singaporean.

Normally, I suspect the enquiry pertains to either my ethnicity or nationality. Here, narrowing the question's parameters does not simplify the answer. Being the product of two generations of inter-cultural marriage, I could ethnically be Indian, Chinese, Indian-Chinese or Chinese-Indian (I could be Singaporean but that's not recognised as an ethnic group). As for nationality, I'm a Singapore citizen but I could be part of the greater diasporic Indian or Chinese nations.

Indeed, in this current epoch of globalisation marked by exceptional degrees of global interconnectedness, my difficulty in expressing my identity is not unique. In this globalised age, articulating identity has become exceedingly challenging. Many pundits argue that globalisation has permitted us to be many things – ethnicity, religion, tribe, nation, region and a host of other markers offer us a dizzying array of identities.

With this smorgasbord of identities available, Velayutham has written an ambitious book exploring the altering strategies employed by the Singaporean government when crafting a Singaporean identity in response to the multiplicity of identities created by globalisation.

For Velayutham, the nub of the issue for the Singaporean government lies with Singapore being both a global city and a nation-state. According to Velayutham, the transience of global cities undermines the capacity of the state to rely on its citizenry: a detached population that typifies a global city, with no sense of belonging and commitment, would pose a direct challenge to the survival of Singapore.

The manner in which the topic is dealt with in this book is commendable with the book broadly divided into two parts. In the first part, the different strategies adopted by the government to develop a national identity are examined. Three key phases are identified.

Firstly, immediately post-independence, the nation-building project focused on economic development as a means to create a community out of heterogeneous diasporic groups. The second phase then focused on Asian values. This phase attempted to develop a distinct Singaporean identity against the foil of "Westernisation". In the third phase, Singaporean identity is founded on being "at home" while being in a cosmopolitan global city.

In the second part of the book, analysis is turned to "the view from below" by contrasting Singaporean views of their own identity against the constructions of their government. It is here that the book's most valuable contribution is made – few have collected Singaporean opinions on their identity and systematically analysed them as cogently as Velayutham. Interestingly, his analysis indicates that Singaporean identity lacks deep emotion. As Singaporean identity is founded upon material comforts, Singaporeans are detached from the nation with relations between government and people similar to relations between service provider and consumer.

Can the tension between being a global city and a nation-state be resolved? Optimistically, Velayutham believes this is possible. Thanks to its economic success, Singapore has the requisite material building blocks for developing a strong national identity. However, for these blocks to hold together, what is required is the cement of a still underdeveloped active citizenry empowered to demonstrate their commitment to the nation by energetically participating in shaping their nation's destiny.

Though the book concludes that active citizenship is necessary for deeper bonds, it is unfortunate that this point was not fleshed out further. Two questions remain unanswered – how would an active citizenry be developed and are Singaporeans even interested in participating more actively in their polity? The second question may have greater bearing on the discussion. After all, not all consumers want to be shareholders. Many are happy to hop from service provider to service provider if the opportunity knocks.

In a related point, another intriguing but overlooked issue is the assumption that nation-states require a citizenry with a sense of belonging to remain viable. Putting aside the difficulty of measuring belonging, it is questionable if a sense of belonging is necessary at all. Citizenship can be based on a utilitarian calculus where individuals become citizens in those states offering them greatest utility. Many countries already acknowledge this fact. For example, countries experiencing a brain drain do not attempt to stem the drain with emotive arguments. Instead, they increase the opportunity cost of leaving through socio-economic incentives.

Norman Vasu is an assistant professor and coordinator of the Social Resilience Programme at the Centre of Excellence for National Security, S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University